Based on a panel survey conducted in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, this study analyzes the extent to which households recovered from damage due to floods that hit the country in 2010.
INTRODUCTION
Households throughout the world face a wide variety of risks arising from natural disasters, such as floods, droughts, and earthquakes. For instance, Pakistan, from which the household data analyzed in this study were taken, experienced in 2010 the worst floods in its history, which affected 84 districts out of a total 121 districts, killing more than 1,700 people (United Nations, 2010) . Households in low-income developing countries are particularly vulnerable, since their initial welfare levels are already close to the poverty line, institutional arrangements used to cope with disasters are lacking, and early warning systems are absent. To compound issues, the number of natural disasters reported appears to be increasing globally-from fewer than 100 per year in the mid-1970s to approximately 400 per year during the 2000s, according to the emergency events database (EM-DAT). 1 As summarized by Cavallo & Noy (2011) and Sawada (2007) , much research in both the social and natural sciences has been devoted to enhancing our ability to predict disasters, while economic research on natural disasters and their consequences, including the recovery process, has been fairly limited. In the limited economics literature, several authors have investigated macroeconomic impacts, both direct and indirect. For instance, using cross-country panel data, Noy (2009) shows that developing countries face much larger declines in output following disasters of similar relative magnitude than do developed countries or bigger economies, suggesting the importance of a greater ability to mobilize resources for reconstruction. Using similar cross-country panel data, Sawada et al. (2011) demonstrate that natural disasters positively impact welfare (measured by per-capita GDP) in the long run, although they exert a substantial negative impact on welfare in the short run. Coffman & Noy (2012) use a synthetic control methodology to estimate the long-term impacts of a 1992 hurricane on the island economy of Kauai, Hawaii, showing that Kauai's economy was yet to 3 recover after 18 years of the event. These macroeconomic studies have tended to treat disasters as economy-wide covariant shocks, not focusing on within-country or within-village heterogeneity.
However, in terms of the microeconomic impacts of exogenous shocks, there has been an accumulation of theoretical and empirical studies in development economics focusing on households' ability to cope with such shocks. These studies have shown that poor households are likely to suffer not only from low levels of welfare on average but also from fluctuations in their welfare due to their limited coping ability (Fafchamps, 2003; Dercon, 2005) . The inability to avoid declines in welfare when hit by exogenous shocks can be called vulnerability; regarding the measurement of vulnerability, a substantial literature has developed (Ligon & Schechter, 2003; Dercon, 2005; Kurosaki, 2006; Dutta et al., 2011) . These studies tend to focus on how idiosyncratic shocks impact welfare. This is unsatisfactory, as Ligon & Schechter (2003) demonstrate that aggregate risk is much more important than idiosyncratic sources of risk.
Furthermore, the influence of aggregate shocks on the welfare of households is growing in the process of globalization and with global warming.
To respond to the need for further research, recent years have seen an increasing number of more micro-level studies on the impact of natural disasters. For instance, Carter et al. (2007) analyze the asset dynamics associated with post-disaster recovery at the household level in Honduras (after Hurricane Mitch) and Ethiopia (after prolonged droughts). They show that the poorest households struggled most with shocks and had to adopt costly strategies such as asset smoothing. Mogues (2011) expands the analysis of Ethiopian droughts to demonstrate the importance of precautionary motives for holding wealth. Regarding the impact of droughts on asset dynamics in Africa, Giesbert & Schindler (2012) add evidence from Mozambique. They show that even food-insecure households are able to sustain productive assets when they have 4 unproductive, liquidatable assets and better access to income-generating opportunities. These studies are motivated by the asset poverty trap hypothesis (Carter & Barrett, 2006) , regarding which the empirical evidence is mixed (McKay & Perge, 2013; Kraay & McKenzie, 2014) .
Other studies that have assessed the impact of disasters include de Mel et al. (2012) , who examine the business recovery of microenterprises in Sri Lanka, and Rodriguez-Oreggia et al. (2013) , who investigate the effects of floods and droughts on municipality-level poverty and human development indicators.
Nevertheless, empirical studies on household-level asset recovery from natural disasters remain limited. Regional studies on South Asian economies have been few, although poverty and exposure to natural disasters are serious problems in the region. In terms of characteristics of the economy, mixed farming economies under tribal codes are not studied in detail. Economies facing conflicts such as civil war or insurgencies are rarely analyzed. Finally, the interaction of productive assets and unproductive, non-liquidatable assets has not been analyzed in the literature.
This study attempts to fill these gaps in the literature by investigating household-level asset recovery from floods in a tribal and conflict-ridden society with a focus on unproductive, non-liquidatable assets. Which types of households are quicker to recover from nation-wide flood damage? Is there any heterogeneity in recovery attributable to the variation in damage extent and social status? Do recovery patterns differ between the period immediately after floods and a year after? How are the dynamic recovery patterns related with the social structure in such an economy? To examine these questions, I employ a panel dataset collected in the province of social behavior is governed by tribal codes known as Pakhtunwali (Ahmed, 1980) . One of the key elements of Pakhtunwali is the preservation of the honor of the family, especially of women members. In the 2000s, law and order in the region deteriorated, making the region difficult for outside researchers to conduct detailed surveys.
Since the recovery process is dynamic in nature, a single "snapshot" survey after a disaster cannot comprehensively provide detailed information. Utilizing the panel dataset, I show that households that initially had fewer assets and were hit by greater flood damage had more difficulty in recovering; after one year, their recovery had improved, but there remained substantial variation across households regarding the extent of recovery; and households headed by traditional leaders and households whose houses were damaged by the floods experienced a deceleration in the speed of recovery. The recovery of productive assets was affected by concerns regarding the reconstruction of houses, which are unproductive and non-liquidatable in the survey area. I interpret the results as a reflection of the tribal value placed on honor preservation in conflict-ridden situations. Given the scarcity of such an analysis in the literature, the evidence shown in this study is expected to shed light on the recovery process after natural disasters, despite the small sample size involved.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Following this introductory section, Section 2 puts forward a conceptual framework for the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the study area, survey design, and the dataset. Section 4 explains the empirical strategy, followed by regression results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
ASSET RECOVERY FROM NATURAL DISASTERS
The empirical models in this paper are motivated by the literature on consumption smoothing (Fafchamps, 2003; Dercon, 2005) , which refers to the use of assets as a buffer to 6 smooth consumption, and the literature on asset poverty traps, which indicates that there are situations in which assets are smoothed and consumption sacrificed to avoid poverty traps (Carter & Barrett, 2006; Carter et al., 2007) . In this section, I briefly explain the conceptual framework underlying the empirical investigation.
A household makes a living using its productive, liquidatable assets, whose value is denoted by a scaler A t . Its expected value in the next period, A t+1 , is an increasing function of A t ,
is S-shaped with three intersections with a 45-degree line, there could be multiple equilibriums with the lower one corresponding to the asset poverty trap.
Now assume that a shock due to a natural disaster occurs, which destroys the productive asset. Let Z p be the amount of damage that occurs between period t and t+1. By definition, the productive asset value is reduced by Z p immediately after the shock.
However, the expected value of A t+1 given the productive asset shock may not equal f(A t ) -Z p for two reasons. First, the household may rebuild the asset to compensate for the damage caused by the natural disaster. The household can use its own savings, mutual help inside the community, or aid from outside 3 to replenish the asset. How much of Z p is transferred to the realized value of A t+1 is thus a measure of resilience of the productive asset against the natural disaster.
Second, the household may sell productive assets to cope with other shocks that occur between period t and t+1. When a natural disaster occurs, not only productive assets but also unproductive assets (such as houses, household durables, etc.) may be damaged. Household income may also be reduced (for example, standing crops may be destroyed). Let Z n be the amount of damage to unproductive, non-liquidatable assets and Z y be the unexpected reduction in income. Even when the household does not sell productive assets to cope with these shocks, these shocks constrain the household's liquidity positions so that it becomes difficult for the 7 household to replenish productive assets. As a net effect, it is expected that the realized value of the productive assets in period t+1 is a non-increasing function of Z n and Z y .
Assuming the absence of natural disasters between t+1 and t+2, the recovery process is expected to continue. It may be a reversion to the initial path of f(.) or permanent divergence from the initial path. If a sufficiently long panel dataset with a large number of observations is available, we may be able to distinguish the two different dynamics. However, as the dataset available for this study is a small-size panel dataset with two post-disaster periods, this is not attempted. Instead, I propose several hypothesis tests using the following model for g i , the asset change for household i. The model is similar to the one adopted by Carter et al. (2007):
where
, and γ 3i are parameters to be estimated, X i is a vector of household and village characteristics, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and u i is an error term. Parameters γ 1i , γ 2i , and γ 3i may shift depending on the characteristics of household i, which are associated with the household's self-insurance ability and social and market access conditions (Carter et al., 2007) . As a key variable for X i and a shifter of γ parameters, household characteristics related to tribal codes are included. An equation analogous to equation (1) is estimated using the data from one year after:
where the error term, u' i , incorporates shocks that occur between t+1 and t+2 as well.
A null hypothesis of H 0 : γ 1i = -1 corresponds to the complete absence of recovery. This is because a coefficient of -1 on the asset shock variable would mean that the household had not recovered at all from the shock (e.g., a $100 loss of assets would reduce the asset level in period 8 t+1 by the same amount). Another null hypothesis of H 0 : γ 1i = 0 corresponds to complete recovery. If both hypotheses are rejected in favor of -1 < γ 1i < 0, partial recovery is suggested.
Similar tests are conducted a year later using the coefficient estimate for γ' 1i . The test of H 0 : γ 1i = γ' 1i corresponds to no change in the recovery status between period t+1 and t+2. If it is rejected in favor of -1 < γ 1i < γ' 1i ≤ 0, it is suggested that recovery continued between the two periods.
Furthermore, a null hypothesis of H 0 : γ 1m = γ 1n is tested, where γ 1m is γ 1i for all i belonging to category m based on X i and γ 1n is γ 1i for other households. By testing this, we can determine which types of household are quicker to recover from damage caused by natural disasters. In response to the disaster, relief activities were quickly organized by international and domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and government agencies. The Pakistani government also initiated the Watan Card program, to assist the flood-affected population in the reconstruction of damaged houses. Flood-affected families were registered for the program by the government authority and were issued ATM cards that were keyed to accounts to which a total of Rs. 100,000 4 was to be paid in five equal installments. These cards were distributed in 9
December 2010, and the first installment was paid between December 2010 and April 2011. In
July-October 2011, the government issued Watan Cards in areas in which initial allotments had not been assigned. The second installment was delayed in most of Pakistan, due to the government's failure to secure related budgetary funding. Compared with the intensity of the damage, these aid inflows did not appear to be sufficient.
(b) Panel survey
To assess the vulnerability and resilience of rural economies against this unexpected natural disaster, my research team implemented a two-period panel survey of village economies in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan; this was designed to be a pilot study for a larger survey to follow. We chose the district of Peshawar because it was one of the worst hit districts in the province and it was the district where we conducted a survey of three villages in the 1990s (Kurosaki & Hussain, 1999; Kurosaki & Khan, 2001 ).
As it was designed as a pilot survey, the sample was small and not strictly a random one.
We chose 10 sample villages and 100 sample households (i.e., 10 from each sample village). We tried to include the three villages surveyed in the 1990s but failed in resurveying one of them due to security reasons. We chose the 10 villages so that they would be similar in terms of ethnicity and culture but different in two measures of economic development: geographical access to markets and the percentage of agricultural land under irrigation. In rural Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, unirrigated villages and villages farther away from main roads are poorer than others. After village selection and village-level surveys were undertaken, we indeed found that in such villages, other development indicators were also poor. In finalizing the list of study villages, we also made sure that there was variation regarding the number of damaged houses and the number of persons killed or severely injured across the study villages. The characteristics of the sample villages are illustrated in Appendix Table 1 .
10
We conducted the first round of the survey between December 2010 and February 2011.
In the survey, we collected village-level information from knowledgeable villagers 5 via a structured questionnaire. Using a structured questionnaire for households, we surveyed 10 households in each village. We chose these households such that both relatively rich and poor households, as well as households both severely and mildly affected by flood damage, would be included. Judging from the within-village variation in the dataset, this was successfully achieved.
Kurosaki & Khan (2011) To collect information on changes since the first round of the survey, we conducted the second round survey approximately 12 months after the first round, between December 2011 and January 2012. The second survey successfully covered all 10 sample villages and 100 sample households. We thus compiled a balanced panel of 100 household observations. In the re survey, we collected detailed information on changes in household demography, labor force, physical and monetary assets, aid received, and so on.
Soon after the two rounds of the panel survey, we tried to arrange for the main survey but failed as law and order in the area under study had worsened due to terrorist attacks and armed sectarian conflicts. 6 As a result, we were left with a small panel dataset of 100 households. Therefore, house structure and the institution of Jirga symbolize Pakhtunwali in villages in Peshawar District. All 10 villages under study shared these two characteristics. predominates. This indicates that after the floods, reconstruction activities increased the demand for such labor. The increase in the working population may have resulted from the pressure to generate more income to reconstruct houses and other properties.
(d) Characteristics of sample households
As shown in Table 1 , prior to the floods, households had average landholdings of 3.7
acres. These figures are smaller than the national average but similar to average landholding acreage in Peshawar District. The average value of land assets was Rs. 4.6 million; the median value was Rs. 1.0 million. Regarding land distribution, the average figure may be misleading since as many as 42% of the sample households did not own any land. Owing to this skewed distribution, the median acreage for landholdings was only 1.0 acre. Livestock was another physical asset of importance for the sample households. About 58% of the sample households owned large livestock animals such as cattle and buffalo; 78% of them owned some kind of livestock animals, including goats and poultry. Livestock assets are thus more equally distributed 13 than land assets; nonetheless, their distribution is not completely egalitarian, resulting in a large difference between the mean (Rs. 74,000) and median (Rs. 34,000). Adding other business assets such as poultry sheds, apiculture facilities, etc. to land and livestock, I compiled the empirical variable for productive assets, corresponding to A t in Section 2; I obtained a mean of Rs. 4.7 million and a median of Rs. 1.1 million. The distribution of A t was thus characterized by a large mass of households at or around the poverty line and a small pool of middle-class households.
Each of the large mass holds a small lot of assets, whereas the asset levels of the small middle class are comparatively and distinctively higher. This pre-flood distribution is similar to that seen in the panel data from 1996 /97-1999 /2000 (Kurosaki & Hussain, 1999 Kurosaki & Khan, 2001) ,
where the welfare levels of the former group were at around the income poverty line while those of the latter group were above the poverty line.
These households sustained substantial damage in the 2010 floods (see Panel 4, Table 1 ).
The extent of house damage was based on the estimated cost of reconstruction or repairs. In the study area, people do not use houses as liquid assets. Sales transactions are extremely rare and mortgaging houses is unknown in the villages. Standing crops were damaged heavily as well.
Panel 5, Table 1 , summarizes information on aid received. Slightly less than one-half of the sample households received emergency aid from NGOs, emergency aid from the government, and Watan Cards. The total aid received was only 5% of the estimated value of the flood damage.
Therefore, on average, aid received was not large relative to the flood damage. Nevertheless, for those households whose initial wealth level was not high and which had suffered substantial losses to houses, the percentage was much higher (20-30% of the flood damage).
(e) Asset dynamics
Panel 6, Table 1 , shows changes in productive assets from the pre-flood level. Changes that had occurred by the first survey correspond to g i in equation (1) . At the time of the first survey, however, their asset levels slightly declined and further declined a year after. These declines were mostly due to reduced numbers of livestock animals.
The asset dynamics of the latter (solid line) resemble the pattern for the whole sample.
In Panel (b) of Figure 1 , the dotted line represents the asset dynamics of villagers whose initial productive assets were larger than the median, while the solid line represents those of other villagers. Because livestock were more important than land in the asset portfolios of households that were initially poorer, the solid line (small initial assets) shows a larger decline in assets due to floods than does the dotted line (large initial assets). Recovery from the flood 15 damage was quick among the initially rich but then decelerated.
There is heterogeneity between those who suffered substantial house damage and those who did not (Panel (c)) and between those households headed by a traditional leader and others (Panel (d) ). The speed of recovery declined between the first survey and resurvey among those who suffered from substantial house damage and those headed by a traditional leader. These types of household had recovered more quickly at the time of the first survey than other households had. The reason for this deceleration is investigated further in the next section.
In the survey, we also collected information on the level of recovery, taking one of 11
percentage-point categories from 0 (no recovery) to 100 (complete recovery). The level of recovery was self-assessed; respondents were directly asked "How would you express the level of recovery of your house as a percentage (0 as no recovery, 100 as complete recovery to the pre-flood level) today?" The underlined "house" was changed to land, livestock, etc. to obtain a full picture. When respondents had difficulty giving a percentage, investigators helped using graphical representations. Although about one-third of our respondents did not complete primary education, they appeared to understand the question well, as the resulting numbers were mostly consistent with the information on current assets (in terms of quantity) obtained in interviews that took place prior to asking respondents the self-assessment question.
<Table 2 here>
The recovery rates at the ends of 2010 and 2011 are summarized in Table 2 . At the end of 2010, recovery rates were higher for crops than for houses, land, or livestock; at the end of 2011, recovery rates were improved with respect to all kinds of damage. The average overall recovery rate was 86%, compared to 69% one year earlier. Especially with regard to crops and livestock, recovery was quick, and the average was close to 100%. On the other hand, recovery rates for land and houses were not very high. A substantial portion of the sample households 16 reported that their recovery rates with regard to their land and houses were less than 50% at the end of 2011. In addition to their own resources, informal credit transactions played an important role in helping affected households rehabilitate their livelihoods and reconstruct their asset bases -47 respondents borrowed from informal sources and only 2 borrowed from institutional sources (resurvey data).
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
As shown in the previous section, at the time of the resurvey, most of the affected households were in the process of recovering from flood damage. The recovery dynamics were heterogeneous and dependent on pre-flood household characteristics. In this section, I describe how to quantify the asset dynamics, based on the conceptual framework discussed in Section 2.
As the number of observations is small, I cannot estimate a model featuring many explanatory variables. To maintain degrees of freedom in the regression analysis, I ignore the potential non-linearity in asset growth. More concretely, I approximate h(A t ) in equation (1) and (2) linearly. The first reason for this simplification is that the focus of this paper is not on testing the asset poverty trap hypothesis. The second reason is that non-parametric and parametric estimation of the function using data from the same district collected in the 1990s
show that the function is approximately linear. 9 I also employ only three variables for X i in equation (1) and (2) to maintain degrees of freedom: household size (quantity of human capital), the household head's education (quality of human capital in the modern context), and the household head's traditional leader dummy (quality of human capital in the traditional context including the Pakhtunwali factor).
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With the parsimony in choosing explanatory variables, omitted variable bias is a concern, as is measurement error as the sample is not strictly random. To partially address these 17 concerns, I include village fixed effects to control for unobservable village-level factors. With village fixed effects, I depend on within-village, between-household variation in flood damage to identify the γ parameters in equations (1) and (2). Thus, the basic specification I estimate is:
where α v is a village fixed effect. Using the resurvey data, a similar equation is estimated using g' i as the dependent variable.
To identify which group was more resilient, I extend equation (3) with interaction terms involving Z pi :
where D i is a dummy variable showing household i belonging to category m. To maintain degrees of freedom, I do not employ multiple categories simultaneously. Instead, I include one category in equation (4), one by one.
To supplement the estimation results based on equations (3) and (4), I estimate a different empirical model using the subjective percentage recovery in Table 2 as the dependent variable. Let R i be the recovery percentage of productive assets until period t+1. Note that
which indicates that by regressing R i on X i , we can enrich our understanding of how γ 1i in equation (1) One problem of using R i as the dependent variable is that it is not defined for households with Z pi = 0. As shown in Tables 1 and 2 , the number of households that suffered from flood damage to their land or livestock is much smaller than 100. Furthermore, the recovery rate for livestock reached 100% by the resurvey time, with no variation. For these reasons, I estimate the supplementary model for "overall" recovery and house recovery only.
In all regression analyses, flood damage variables are treated as exogenous. If they are endogenous to the household's asset decision-making, their coefficients may suffer from endogeneity bias. Although this is a valid concern, I cannot correct for it econometrically because of the small size of the dataset and the lack of appropriate instrumental variables. As the variation in flood damage is explained well by the household initial characteristics and village fixed effects (see Kurosaki & Khan, 2011) , I hope that the inclusion of these variables as explanatory variables minimizes the endogeneity bias, if any. In period t+1, neither house damage nor crop income damage affected the recovery of productive assets. However, in period t+2, house damage had a significantly negative coefficient.
CORRELATES OF THE RECOVERY PROCESS (a) Changes in productive assets
This appears to suggest that productive assets were not used to replenish reductions in income due to floods but used to reconstruct damaged houses. Looking at the coefficients on the three human capital variables, all of them are positive in period t+1 and the one on the education is statistically significant. In period t+2, in contrast, two of them have negative coefficients and the one on the traditional leader dummy is statistically significant. The significant coefficient implies that if a non-leader household had been headed by a traditional leader, the household's productive asset would have been lower by Rs. 89,500. Although this appears large (the mean asset reduction was Rs. 24,500), the amount is reasonable considering that the major portion of the liquidated assets was used for house reconstruction (the mean house damage was Rs.
139,000). The patterns shown in Table 3 appear to suggest that the undesirable impact of house damage on the recovery of productive assets was realized with a time lag and that the initial superiority in recovery among households with better human capital was lost over time. Table 4 reports the regression results for equation (4) Second, I introduce, one-by-one, each of the three variables that have significant coefficients in Table 3 (flood damage to house, years of education, and traditional leadership status). As shown in Panel 1, Table 4 , households with initially smaller productive assets recovered more slowly than did households with initially larger productive assets, similar to the findings in Cater et al.
(2007) for Honduras. In this case, among the initially poor households, initial recovery was not different from zero (the null hypothesis of γ 11 = -1 was not rejected). However, the difference 20 between the two types of households was statistically insignificant.
<Table 4 here>
The interaction term with flood damage to houses shows an interesting contrast (Panel 2, Table 4 ). In period t+1, the difference was small and statistically insignificant. After a year, those whose houses had sustained substantial damage were still in the recovery process while those whose houses had sustained little damage had already completed recovery. The difference between the two types of household was statistically significant. Households headed by less educated heads had more difficulty in recovery in period t+1 (Panel 3). The null hypothesis of γ 11 = -1 was not rejected. By contrast, households headed by more educated heads recovered with statistical significance. This contrast was reversed in period t+2. Households headed by less educated heads achieved full recovery by that time while more educated households were still in the recovery process. Although not statistically significant, a similar reversal can be seen in comparing households headed by traditional leaders and other households (Panel 4). Those with higher levels of human capital (both modern and traditional) enjoyed a quicker recovery a few months after the natural disasters; however, this superiority disappeared one year after. I speculate that the patterns shown in Panels 2-4 reflect concerns for house reconstruction, as discussed below.
(b) Overall and house recovery Table 5 reports the regression results using recovery percentage points as the dependent variable. Regarding initial overall recovery, coefficients on household size and head's education are positive and significant. The coefficient on education indicates that if an uneducated household head had had 10 years of schooling, his household's overall recovery percentage would have been higher by 7.7 percentage points. Looking at the flood damage variables, coefficients on crop damage are insignificant, confirming the results in Table 3 . Coefficients on 21 productive asset damage and house damage are negative, as expected, but only the coefficient on house damage in the house recovery regression is statistically significant. The coefficient indicates that if the damage to a house had been Rs.100,000 greater, the household's house recovery percentage would have been lower by 5.7 percentage points. The coefficient on house damage is also negative with regard to overall recovery but statistically insignificant (p=0.197).
<Table 5 here>
After one year, the heterogeneity in recovery due to different levels of damage became more substantial. All four coefficients on productive asset damage and house damage are negative and statistically significant. An interesting finding is the positive and significant coefficient on the traditional leader dummy when the house recovery is the dependent variable.
The coefficient indicates that if a non-leader household had been headed by a traditional leader, the household's house recovery percentage would have been higher by 12.9 percentage points. In contrast, the traditional leader dummy has a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient when the dependent variable is the overall recovery. The results in Table 5 , when combined with those in Tables 3 and 4 , suggest that compared with non-leader households, households headed by a traditional leader shifted their efforts to house reconstruction and repairs in period t+2, resulting in quicker house recovery but slower recovery with regard to productive assets.
(c) Interpretations of the results
The results in Tables 3-5 were found to be robust to various alterations. 11 These results can be summarized as two key findings. First, the recovery of productive assets was quite homogeneous in a few months after the floods excepting those that sustained more substantial damage to their productive assets and the superiority in recovery among more educated households. Second, the recovery of productive assets became more heterogeneous one year after.
Those households that suffered from more substantial damage to their houses and were headed 22 by a traditional leader experienced a deceleration in recovery speed. These findings show the importance of the traditional leadership within a village on the one hand and the interaction of productive and unproductive, non-liquidatable assets (i.e., houses) on the other.
I interpret this as a reflection of tribal codes prevalent in the study villages, known as
Pakhtunwali. Within a context of increased terrorist attacks and violent conflicts, the 2010 floods damaged the houses of many villagers. In contrast, human casualties were relatively small and the field observations did not indicate that the floods had destroyed social capital or disrupted social norms. As a result of these factors, the sample households gave house reconstruction and repair high priority over productive asset recovery in order to preserve the honor of their families.
This tendency became discernible after the immediate recovery phase was over, probably because flood victims were preoccupied with emergent relief during that phase.
As an anecdote to substantiate this interpretation, the dataset shows that 3 out of the 16 households headed by a traditional leader sold their cows between period t +1 and t+2 and 2 out of the 16 sold a portion of their land. All five of these households spent the major portion of their revenues on their houses, employing fellow villagers for the reconstruction work. All five rated their house recovery at the time of the resurvey less than 100 percentage points. Does the recovery process described so far indicate a recovery of the village economy to the initial asset distribution or a transition to a new regime with a different distribution of welfare levels and assets? The interaction terms in Table 4 indicate the tendency for initially asset-rich households to recover quickly. If this effect dominates, inequality in productive assets should be exacerbated as a result of turbulence due to the floods. On the other hand, those households with greater house damage had difficulty in recovering productive assets after a year. In addition, aid allocation was targeted towards those with lower initial assets, although weakly (Kurosaki & Khan, 2011) . These tendencies work in the direction of reducing inequality in productive assets.
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From the regression results alone, it is difficult to judge which effect dominates.
However, as the floods did not destroy human capital and social capital (including the tribal codes), it appears to be safe to conclude that a drastic change in inequality in wealth cannot be the ultimate result of the 2010 floods. Thus, the tentative conclusion of this paper is that although damage stemming from the 2010 floods was massive, the resulting turbulence did not result in transition to a new regime with a completely different distribution of welfare levels and assets;
instead, the rural economy seems to be recovering to the initial regime. assets from flood damage, it was found that households that initially had fewer assets and had sustained more extensive flood damage had greater difficulty in recovering. After one year, recovery was continuing, but with substantial heterogeneity across households. Those households that sustained more substantial damage to their houses and were headed by traditional leaders experienced a deceleration in recovery speed. My interpretation is that due to the tribal code of preserving the honor of the family, the sample households gave house reconstruction and repair high priority over productive asset recovery after the emergency phase was over. Because of the preservation of such social norms and human capital, I speculated that the village economy was gradually recovering towards the initial wealth distribution, which was characterized by a large mass of households whose welfare and asset levels were around the poverty line, together with a small grouping of middle-class households whose asset levels were 24 sufficiently high to ensure them a welfare level above the poverty line.
The findings of this paper have several implications for policy-oriented research regarding household-level resilience against natural disasters in developing countries. First, the pattern of recovery dynamics is heterogeneous; thus, minute targeting is required. It is possible that without such a consideration, interventions for ameliorating the damage from natural disasters can be ineffective for certain households in affected areas. Second, the contrast found in this paper between the recovery process immediately after floods and the recovery process a year after appears to indicate that the recovery process at the household level is non-linear and time-varying. In such situations, a single "snapshot" survey after a disaster may not provide precise information on who needs to be supported. Additional knowledge gained from a resurvey could be substantial. Third, the recovery of productive assets should not be isolated from the need to replenish unproductive, non-liquidatable assets. The case studied in this paper is probably one where this need is strong, due to the conflict-ridden and tribal nature of the society.
Because of the small sample size and the limited information on returns on various types of assets therein, the conclusion of this paper is tentative and preliminary. Moreover, I cannot claim that the findings are generalizable to other settings. The provision of further support for this paper's findings and interpretations thereof is left to future research. report unweighted statistics in Tables 1 and 2. 8 Unfortunately, full information on household income or consumption was not available in the dataset. The percentage in the text was inferred from the partial information contained in Kurosaki & Khan (2011) . 9 See Kurosaki (2013), who shows that the dynamics are almost linear for livestock and land.
The dataset used there is a panel dataset of approximately 300 households collected from three villages in 1996/97 and 1999/00. The absence of multiple equilibriums in the asset dynamics curve in Pakistan is also supported by Naschold (2013), who uses a dataset more representative of Pakistan than the one used by Kurosaki (2013) . 10 In addition to these variables, I also attempted a specification with aid received as an explanatory variable. As the added variable was insignificant robustly, I did not include it in specifications in this paper. The insignificance could probably be due to the mixing of the recovery-promoting effect of aid and the selection effect for aid toward households that 28 inherently have more difficulty in recovering. 11 Namely, I tried different empirical definitions with respect to the pre-flood assets and adopted weighted least squares reflecting the difference in sampling probability instead of OLS, and Tobit specifications reflecting the limited range of the dependent variables. Details of these robustness checks are available on request. 12 This does not imply, however, that there were no individual households that suffered a sustained deterioration in their welfare levels. Public policies play an important role in supporting such households in the aftermath of devastating floods. Notes: The number of observations is 100 (10 from each sample village). Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. OLS regression with village fixed effects is employed. The regression coefficient is significantly different from 0 at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level. The recovery status is defined only for the subsample that suffered from flood damage, resulting in a smaller number of observations than in Tables 3-4. 
